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THE PUBLIC'S AIRWAVES: WHAT DOES
THE PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRE OF
TELEVISION BROADCASTERS?
REED E. HUNDTt
INTRODUCTION

Since its enactment in 1934, the Communications Act has
required the Federal Communications Commission to grant and
renew licenses to use the electromagnetic spectrum only after
determining whether "the public interest, convenience, and necessi-

ty will be served." 1 Accordingly, anyone who wants a license to
broadcast by means of television-the medium on which I intend
to focus-must satisfy that "public interest" standard In addition
to that broad standard, Congress has provided specific guidance in
four areas. First, in the Children's Television Act of 1990,' Congress directed the Commission, "in its review of any application
for renewal of a commercial or noncommercial television broadcast license," to "consider the extent to which the licensee ...

has

t Chairman, Federal Communications Commission. This article is drawn from a series of three speeches originally delivered in 1995-96. The last of those speeches, on
protecting children from media indecency and violence, was delivered at the Duke Law
Journal's 27th Annual Administrative Law Conference on Feb. 9, 1996. The footnotes
below were added later and are intended as an aid to the reader. I would like to thank
my friends and colleagues Christopher J. Wright and Debra A. Weiner for their substantial contributions to the preparation of the original speeches and this article.
1. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1988).
2. The Supreme Court has stated that the "'public interest' to be served under the
Communications Act is... the interest of the listening public in 'the larger and more
effective use of radio.'" NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (quoting 47
U.S.C. § 303(g) (1940)). Another element of the standard is "the ability of the licensee
to render the best practicable service to the community reached by his broadcasts." Id.
(quoting FCC v. Sanders Radio Stations, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940)).
3. Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
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served the educational and informational needs of children., 4 Second, with respect to political campaigns, Congress has instituted a
number of requirements, the most important of which are that
candidates are entitled to pay only the "lowest unit charge" for
campaign advertisements during the forty-five days preceding a
primary election and the sixty days preceding a general election,5
and that broadcasters who permit a potential candidate to use
their stations also must provide "equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office."'6 Third, Congress has prohibited
indecent broadcasts outside of "safe harbor" hours, which currently extend from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.7 A fourth requirement has just
been established: The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires
television manufacturers to install "V-chips" to assist parents in
controlling their children's access to programming that contains
"sexual, violent, or other indecent material about which parents
should be informed before it is displayed to children." 8
By providing news, sports, and entertainment for free, and by
responding to market forces and providing programming that people want to watch and advertisers want to support, broadcasters
undeniably serve the public. And broadcasters should certainly be
praised for their creativity, particularly in bringing entertainment
to the public. But it is clear, that Congress meant to require
broadcasters to do more than what they would do anyway in order to compete in the video marketplace for audience and for advertising revenue. There would be no need for the Commission to
determine whether a licensee is serving the public interest if all
that means is that the broadcaster is in business competing against
other broadcasters and other providers of video programming,
such as cable operators and operators of satellite systems. Clearly,
broadcasters are subject to distinct public interest obligations not
imposed on other media.9

4. 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a) (Supp. V 1993).
5. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b)(1) (1988).
6. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
7. See Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16, 106 Stat. 949,
954 (1992) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. V 1993)); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 111), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct 701 (1996).
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 551(b)-(c), 110 Stat. 56,
139-42 (to be codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
9. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
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The public interest obligations imposed by Congress do not
necessarily imply heavy regulation. Rather, in giving meaning to
the public interest standard, the FCC should balance Congress'
determination that the private sector should be permitted to use
the public airwaves with its further decision that this use must
accord with the public's view on the desirable utilization of the
public resource. In my view, this means the FCC should deregulate virtually all commercial aspects of broadcasting, because they
are best left to the market, while we improve our rules in those
areas where market forces will not deliver the services Congress
and the public interest require.'
Congress has determined that market forces are unlikely to
produce desirable amounts of children's educational programming
and campaign information, and may produce a "race to the bottom" with respect to indecency and violence. Accordingly, its
specific directives with respect to children's educational television,
campaign advertising, and indecency, along with the new V-chip
legislation, plainly require broadcasters to do something other than
10. The FCC has already begun to deregulate the commercial aspects of television
broadcasting by eliminating two unnecessary rules. Our decision on the Financial and
Syndication Interest (Fin/Syn) Rules ended the process begun in 1993 to eliminate those
rules, which restricted the ability of the established networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) to
own and syndicate television programming. Review of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, §§ 73.659-.663 of the Commission's Rules (Report and Order), 10 F.C.C.R.
12165 (1995); In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules (Second
Report and Order), 8 F.C.C.R. 3282, modified in part, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
8 F.C.C.R. 8270 (1993), afjd sub noma.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th
Cir. 1994). Similarly, our Prime Time Access Rule (PTAR) decision eliminated rules
which, with certain exceptions, generally prohibited "network-affiliated television stations
in the top 50 television markets ... from broadcasting more than three hours of network programs . . . or former network programs . . . during the four prime time viewing

hours." In re Review of the Prime Time Access Rule, § 73.658(K) of the Commission's
Rules, Report and Order, FCC 95-314 (released July 31, 1995), 1995 WL 449873, at *2.
We found that PTAR was "no longer needed to promote the development of non-network sources of television programming." Id. at *3.
In addition, in early 1995, the Commission proposed to loosen the national limits
on ownership of television stations. Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing
Television Broadcasting, Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules (Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 10 F.C.C.R. 3524, 3567-68 (1995). Congress ultimately
adopted the proposal in § 202(c) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, by eliminating
the numerical limit on ownership of stations by a single person or entity and raising the
percentage share of the national audience that such stations may reach. Congress also
adopted in § 202 a moderate loosening of radio ownership limits-a position that I proposed in an address at the National Association of Broadcasters Radio Show in September 1995. Chairman Reed E. Hundt, Remarks at the NAB Radio Show (Sep. 8, 1995)
(transcript on file with author).
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respond to market forces. Nevertheless, with respect to these four
public interest areas: (1) the amount of educational programming
for children on commercial broadcast stations is so limited that it
falls below the levels prevailing prior to the FCC's rule changes in
the early 1980s concerning children's educational programming;"
(2) broadcasters make a lot of money from campaign advertising,
but they leave the public, which relies predominantly on television
for news, extremely dissatisfied with the connection between
fundraising to buy broadcast time and breakdowns in our political
process; (3) Congress asks the FCC to guarantee that indecent
broadcasts will not run when children are likely to be in the audience-a mandate approved by the Supreme Court-yet broadcasters have devoted years of effort and millions of dollars in fees to
litigate for the right to broadcast indecent shows whenever they
wish, and subsequently to minimize the restrictions on such broad-

casts that the courts will uphold; 12 and (4) researchers agree that
television violence has been an important cause of the rise in
violent crime during my lifetime,13 and in March of this year
broadcasters agreed for the first time to cooperate with government efforts to address this issue by pledging to develop a television rating system for use with the newly mandated V-chip. 14

11. See En Banc Hearings on Children's Television, MM Docket No. 93-48 (FCC
June 28, 1994) (summary of remarks by Squire D. Rushnell, former ABC Vice President
of Children's Television); NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN
THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 52 (1995).

12. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC authority to
sanction a broadcaster who airs indecent material when children are likely to be in the
audience); Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT 1), 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (upholding FCC's generic definition of indecency, but vacating FCC findings that
two post-10 p.m. programs were indecent); Action for Children's Television v. FCC
(ACT I), 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding FCC's generic definition of indecency, but striking down statutory 24-hour ban on indecent broadcasts); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC (ACT 11), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (upholding prohibition of the broadcast of indecent programming between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 701 (1996).
13. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. The accumulated scientific evidence "strongly suggests that there is a link between violence on television and that in
the real world-" UCLA CENTER FOR COMMUNICATION POLICY, THE UCLA TELEVISION
VIOLENCE MONrrORING REPORT 10 (1995) [hereinafter UCLA VIOLENCE REPORT]. In
addition, "[slome researchers have gone so far as to assign a numerical value to the connection between violence on television and violence in the real world. Leonard Eron has
stated that 10% of societal violence is attributable to exposure to violent media images."
14. See infra note 19.
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Overall, it is fair to say that the broadcast industry has for
many years opposed virtually all governmental efforts to improve
the impact of broadcasting on society in the areas of educational

television, nonviolent programming, family-friendly (as opposed to
indecent) programming, and programming that promotes the politi-

cal process through extensive coverage of issues and free access by
candidates to voters. In general, broadcasters assert that they do
enough already and that the government should not be involved in

lawmaking or rulemaking that constrains their marketplace behavior."
Lately, however, there are signs that broadcasters (and, to a
greater extent, cable operators) are beginning to understand the

need to support efforts that improve their service to the public. In
1993, some networks began broadcasting advisories about the violent or sexual content of their programming, and in 1994 broadcasters and cable operators established monitors to annually evaluate the violent content in their programming. 16 Most recently,
broadcasters discussed the quality of their programming with President Clinton at a White House meeting where they announced

their voluntary plan to develop a television rating system to work
with the V-chip. 7 I hope this marks the beginning of a new understanding.

The public does not believe the current level of broadcasters'
performance on any of these issues defines the full limit to use of

15. This view has also been expressed by regulators. See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel
L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207,
209-10 (1982).
16. An historical account of these efforts is set forth in UCLA VIOLENCE REPORT,
supra note 13, at 12-13. That report stresses that the broadcast networks and the cable
operators took these actions in response to a political climate that seemed particularly
conducive to the enactment of legislation to address television violence, and in response
to the Television Program Improvement Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C.A. § 303c (West 1991),
legislation sponsored by Senator Simon that granted networks antitrust immunity for
concerted action to address television violence. In June 1994, Senator Simon agreed to
give broadcast and cable networks an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to regulate
themselves and to work to forestall further Congressional efforts in return for their
agreement to hire independent monitors to report annually for three years on television
violence. The broadcast networks chose the UCLA Center for Communication Policy as
their monitor and the cable networks chose MediaScope. The UCLA Violence Report, a
product of this effort, states that it came about "only because of the 1994 agreement between governmental officials and the television industry. Were there not the fear of governmental legislation, the monitoring that we conducted over the past year probably
never would have occurred." UCLA VIOLENE REPORT, supra note 13, at 14.
17. See infra note 19.
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the public's airwaves that is desirable for society."8 Nor does the
public accept the assertion that marketplace competition for audience and advertising revenues is all that should be asked from
broadcasters in return for the privilege of holding a broadcast
license. In fact, these concerns have become so prominent that the
President took the occasion of the State of the Union Address to
challenge the media to make programming they would want their
"own children and grandchildren to enjoy," to state his support for
V-chip legislation, and to invite broadcasters to the White House
to discuss public concerns about their programming. 9 Congress
and the Supreme Court 'repeatedly have rejected broadcasters'
assertions that they ought not be subject to fair, simple, clear rules
requiring more public interest efforts from them.
In the past fifteen years, the FCC has gotten dangerously out
of step with the wishes of the public and the Congress on these issues. The FCC essentially dismantled the public interest standard
in the early 1980s by conflating the "public interest" with anything
sponsors will support. ° Starting in the 1980s, the FCC also began
the practice of renewing all broadcast licenses without ever finding
a broadcaster to have failed to serve the public interest. In renewal proceedings every five years since the late 1970s,2 the FCC
has renewed almost every single broadcast license at least three
times, and has taken away not one license for failure to provide
public interest programming. In short, the FCC has eliminated
rules that promoted public interest programming otherwise
unprovided by marketplace competition. The FCC has also pulled
the teeth out of enforcement powers that Congress asked it to use
to obtain a guarantee from every broadcast station that they will
18. For example, one poll showed that 80% of Americans surveyed agreed that "violence on TV shows is harmful to society." 139 CONG. REc. S5050, S5051-52 (daily ed.
Apr. 28, 1993) (statement of Sen. Simon, including summary of Times Mirror Poll).
19. Prepared Text for the President's State of the Union Message, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
24, 1996, at A-14. Six weeks after the President's address, leaders of the television industry assembled at the White House to announce their cooperation in a voluntary plan to
establish a television ratings system to work with the V-chip. See Alison Mitchell, TV Executives Promise Clinton a Violence Ratings System by '97, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at

A-1.
20. In re Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076
(1984), affd sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
21. Congress has just amended the Communications Act to provide for eight-year license terms. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 203, 110 Stat. at 56, 112 (amending 47
U.S.C. § 307(c)).
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make public interest programming (whether it relates to children
or public affairs generally) available to all Americans over the air
and for free.
In Washington, in the context of both the budget debate and
the efforts that led to final passage of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, a discussion is now taking place about whether new
spectrum-usable for digital broadcasting-should be auctioned.'
Whether or not the digital spectrum licenses are distributed by
auction, it would certainly be possible and desirable to hold the
licensees of digital spectrum to clear, specific, concrete public
interest obligations.
Meanwhile, it is useful to recall that broadcasters did not
initially pay the Treasury for their licenses. Instead their bargain
was part of a social contract in which they agreed to use the airwaves to compete in a commercial business and to serve the public interest in various ways, including educating the public (especiaUy children) and providing access to news and information so
that society and the political process would be bettered. Yet
broadcasters in recent years have routinely made the argument
that, under the First Amendment, any proposed requirement to
serve the public interest in a specific way is unconstitutional.,
Instead, the broadcast industry favors vague standards over specific
requirements.
One advantage of vague requirements, from the industry's
perspective, is that it is extremely difficult to justify a penalty-particularly a serious penalty, such as non-renewal of a broadcast license-for failure to comply with a vague standard. Thus,
for example, broadcasters might argue that if the Commission fails
to specify the minimum amount of children's educational programming necessary to satisfy the Children's Television Act and defines
"educational programming" so broadly as to invite broadcasters to
argue that cartoons from the 1960's qualify as "educational," it
would be very difficult for the Commission to defend a decision

22.

Christopher Stem, No Doubt About Digital, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 1,

1996, at 5.
23. See, e.g., CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (alleging a First Amendment violation
in the FCC's finding that CBS had failed to provide equal access to a presidential candi-

date); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (challenging FCC's authority to sanction broadcasters airing indecent programming when children are likely to be in the
audience); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (challenging the

FCC's fairness doctrine on First Amendment grounds).
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not to renew a license for failure to comply with the Act. This
argument does not rule out case-by-case enforcement decisions
based on a factual record,' but points out the difficulty posed by
vague requirements.
The argument for vague-and in practice unenforced-public
interest requirements is not based on a sound reading of the Constitution. Nor do vague and unenforced standards fulfill congressional intent. Nor do they permit the FCC to act in a reliable, predictable manner in the renewal process. Nor do they lead to optimal
results in terms of what is put on the air. Finally, arguing for
vague and unenforced standards undercuts the broadcasters' claim
that they should be entitled to their licenses because they serve
the public interest.
It is time for a sea change in FCC policy and practice regarding the public interest standard. The Commission should aim to
promulgate a few clear rules that set forth concrete requirements,
are testable in court by any broadcaster who objects to their application, and are enforceable by the FCC in a predictable manner
that makes license renewal proceedings efficient and meaningful.
In particular, with regard to positive requirements, broadcasters
should be required to provide a specific amount of educational
programming for children. In addition, we need a new deal providing candidates with free access to the airwaves. With regard to
negative requirements, broadcasters ought not show indecent or
violent programs during the day or evening hours, when large
numbers of children are likely to be in the audience. However,
broadcasters might be permitted to show programming suitable
only for adults at earlier times of night if they rate their shows so
that they can be read and screened out by computer chips in
televisions, set-top boxes, or other such devices.
These requirements are constitutional. In 1981, in CBS v.
FCC,24 the Supreme Court explained that "[a] licensed broadcaster is 'granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable
part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise it is
burdened by enforceable public obligations.' 5 As I have stated,
those obligations should be few but clear. The only coherent alternative to requiring broadcasters to live up to specific public inter-

24. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
25. Id. at 395 (quoting Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (1966)).
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est obligations would be to require them to pay for their spectrum
and to use the proceeds to fund children's educational television
and campaign advertising.
Broadcasters also should be subject to enforceable public
interest obligations regarding indecency and violence. The Supreme Court dealt specifically with indecency in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.6 In that case, the Court recognized "the government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth' and in supporting
'parents' claim to authority in their own household.'"" The
Court held that those concerns and "[t]he ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material... amply justify
special treatment of indecent broadcasting."' That is so, and the
logic applies to violent programming as well as to indecent programming. Indeed, I think the only fair reading of the social science literature is that violent programming poses a greater hazard
to society than does indecent programming.
The requirements outlined above, and discussed in more detail below, are not only constitutional; their implementation would
advance First Amendment interests. As Professor Sunstein has
explained, the drafters of the First Amendment designed it to
advance "public deliberation and democratic self-goverment"-the
First Amendment has "educational, and aspirational functions."2 9
For those reasons, the Supreme Court in the CBS case held that
"[t]he First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."' 30
Accordingly, a requirement to provide more campaign speech
serves the goals of the First Amendment. So do a requirement designed to educate our children and requirements designed to assist
parents in raising their children as they see fit by providing parents with more information about what is televised.
It is also important that broadcasters' duties be as specific as
possible. The justification for clear rules regarding indecency and
violence is easy to understand. Ambiguous rules have a chilling
effect-they may lead broadcasters not to show programs that are
26. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
27. Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640, 639 (1968)).
28. Id at 750.
29. Cass R. Sunstein, Selling Children, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 21, 1995, at 38
(reviewing NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND:
CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1995)).

30. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981).
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close to the line but on the permissible side of it. But it is also
important that requirements regarding educational programming
and access for candidates be clear. The Commission's current rules
on political advertising, for example, are clear in their intent to
limit the cost of such advertising." But the rules themselves,
which require broadcasters selling time to candidates during specified periods preceding primary and general elections to charge
candidates a rate no higher than that paid for the same amount
and class of time by the broadcaster's best commercial advertisers
(the "lowest unit charge"), are anything but clear. The wide variation among broadcasters in the ways they set commercial advertising rates has resulted in complex rules, an expensive legal regime,
and FCC involvement in the commercial activity of broadcasters.
The absence of clear guidelines can handicap broadcasters
who take their public interest obligations seriously but compete
with less conscientious broadcasters. Thus, vague guidelines lead
some broadcasters to provide a meager amount of public interest
programming or to use a questionable definition of what constitutes such programming. A number of broadcasters, for example,
have claimed that "The Jetsons" and "Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles" are educational. 2
It may seem odd that I am focusing on the virtues of clarity,
when clarity is so obviously preferable to vagueness. But a debate
is currently raging at the FCC over the desirability of specific
guidelines for implementing the Children's Television Act, and the
broadcast industry has argued that vague rules are preferable to
specific rules. Indeed, the broadcasters make the counterintuitive
argument that specific rules are unconstitutional while vague rules
are permissible, as I will discuss in more detail.
This Article argues that the Commission should promulgate a
few clear rules to implement the public service obligations im-

31.

The Commission has explained the purpose of the Lowest Unit Cost Rule as

follows:
Congress added Section 315(b) in 1972 as part of a plan "to give candidates for

public office greater access to the media and . . . to halt the spiraling cost of
campaigning for public office." By adopting the lowest unit charge requirement,
Congress intended to place candidates on a par with a broadcast station's mostfavored advertiser.
Codification of the Commission's Political Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 678, 687
(1991) (citations omitted).
32. In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, 10
F.C.C.R1 6308, 6317 n.32 (1995) [hereinafter Ongoing Children's TV Proceedings].
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posed by Congress on television broadcasters. Such an approach
would ensure that the public obtains something of value in exchange for granting broadcasters the exclusive use of a portion of
the spectrum. That approach also implements the Communications
Act, whereas the establishment of vague standards that are not
enforced does not further Congress's goals. This approach also is
fully consistent with the goals of the First Amendment, and more
consistent than a regime that relies on vague rules.
I suggest that broadcasters should respond to public and congressional requests for improvement by funding one or more institutes, protected by principles of academic freedom, to continually
advise broadcasters and the American people on the impact shows
are having on children. Broadcasters and cable operators have
already started down this road by establishing monitors to evaluate
the violence in their programming and making use of academic
and private expertise for this purpose. The broader advisory
groups that I am suggesting would assist everyone, including the
FCC, in determining what educates children and what does not,
what is inappropriate violence and what is appropriate, and what
is indecent for children. These issues are subtle and are not well
handled by non-experts. Parents, who in a sense are the ultimate
experts, know how hard these issues are. Lawyers like myself
know that we should rely on psychologists and other social scientists for guidance. Broadcasters should seek, and guarantee, that
guidance for everyone.
The next three sections of this Article discuss in greater detail
the positive and negative public interest obligations that I believe
the Commission should promulgate to implement the public service obligations that Congress has imposed on television broadcasters, and the defensibility of these obligations under the First
Amendment. Part I contends that broadcasters should be required
affirmatively, as a condition of their licenses, to provide free
airtime for political candidates or, alternatively, that such airtime
should be publicly funded, generally or out of the proceeds of
spectrum auctions authorized by Congress. These requirements
could be implemented in several ways; each would pass constitutional muster. Part II argues that broadcasters should be required, affirmatively, to present a minimum of three hours a week
of educational and informational programming for children and
that FCC action to impose such a requirement accords fully with
both the Children's Television Act of 1990 and the First Amend-
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ment. Such a requirement is also consistent with the public interest in the education and development of the nation's children, and
the related interest in the development of an educated and motivated electorate. Finally, as described in Part III, broadcasters
should be required to refrain from airing indecent and violent
programming during hours in which children are likely to be
watching, unless they provide parents with the tools to prevent
children from watching such programming aired during those
hours. This, too, serves the public interest and is fully consistent
with the First Amendment.
I. PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATIONS TO REVITALIZE DEMOCRACY

Since the beginning of modern broadcasting following World
War II, the FCC has asserted that the "public interest" necessitates that television be used to develop "an informed public opinion through the [public] dissemination of news and ideas concerning the vital public issues of the day." 33 As it has turned out,
however, broadcasters can help develop "an informed public opinion" about candidates for political office principally by selling
them huge amounts of advertising time. In the aggregate, political
candidates at all levels spent $300 million on media advertising in
1992.' In 1994, the amount36 was $355 million.S In 1996, it is expected to top $500 million.
The cost of television advertising makes fundraising an enormous entry barrier for candidates seeking public office, an oppressive burden for incumbents pursuing reelection, a continuous
threat to the integrity of our political institutions, and a principal
cause of the erosion of public respect for public service. According
to the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, in
1992 the average Senate candidate in a contested election spent
$2.4 million on media expenses.3 Like all averages, even this big

33. CASS R. SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 4 (1993)
(quoting Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees (Report of the Commission), 13 F.C.C.
1246, 1249 (1949)).
34. Kevin Goldman, Jump in Ad Outlays Should Make TV a Winner in 1996 Elec-

tions, WALL ST. J.,July 14, 1995, at B6 (citing figures provided by the Television Bureau
of Advertising).
35. Id
36.

Id

37.

COMMITTEE FOR STUDY OF THE AMERICAN

ELECTORATE, STUDY FOR THE

CONFERENCE ON CAMPAIGN REFORM 2 (press release on file with author).
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number conceals the magnitude of the problem. In a recent California Senate race, two candidates together spent more than $50
million on electronic media. The average House candidate in a
contested election spent $250,000 on media expenses. 3'8 That candidate therefore needs to raise, on average, $2,500 a week every
week for the two years between elections. The figure for Senators
is a whopping $7,500 per week over six years. These targets typically must be met with lots of relatively small contributions obtained in days and nights of wearisome pleading. And there's no
end in sight. Based on his study of this issue, Norman Ornstein of
the American Enterprise Institute has concluded that "[t]he largest
and fastest growing expense in House and Senate campaigns is
television advertising."39
It is impossible to overestimate the harm to the legislative
process caused by the sheer amount of time required to raise
funds for television advertising. Former Congressman Bob Edgar,
a Pennsylvania Democrat, said that during an election year,
"Eighty percent of my time, 80% of my staff's time, 80% of my
events and meetings were fundraisers."' As an aide to a Senator
told the National Journal in 1990, "During hearings of Senate
committees, you can watch Senators go to phone booths in the
committee rooms to dial for dollars."'" This system visits immeasurable frustration on our finest public servants. It's no coincidence that, as fundraising needs soar, incumbents decline to seek
reelection in record numbers.
Efforts to reform this system are being pushed from various
directions. Congress has attempted to address it in ongoing efforts
in the context of campaign finance reform.42 Broadcasters, too,
have expressed interest in reforming the political process. In 1995,
Fox Chairman Rupert Murdoch said that the time politicians must
spend raising money is a "cancer we have to face up to."'4 3 He
38.
39.

1l
Norman Ornstein, Money in Politics, in THE RIPON FORUM, July/Aug. 1992, at

15.
40. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and PracticalSuperiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L, REV. 1160, 1188 (1994) (quoting Bob Edgar).
41. Id.
42. According to the Congressional Research Service, as of March 31, 1996, 66 bills
on campaign finance reform had been introduced in the 104th Congress. JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE

LEGISLATION IN THE 104TH CONGRESS Summary (Apr. 5, 1996).
43. Steve McClellan, Businessmen/BroadcastersSpeak Out, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
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added that "we have to look at systems in other countries where
time is given to candidates."' Earlier this year he announced
Fox's plans to provide free airtime to candidates in the 1996 presidential race: one hour on election eve for final presentations by
the leading candidates, one minute breaks in prime time for those
candidates to address issues in the three to four weeks prior to
the election, and additional one hour or half-hour time periods in
which the other networks will also devote time to statements by
the candidates.45
Some suggest that strict caps should be placed on the amount
of money spent on campaigns. Even if constitutional, such caps
are misguided. We are all bombarded by a blizzard of media every day. Candidates need to compete with sales pitches for soap
and software to get attention. They need more time to win that
competition for the eyes and ears of voters. Limiting candidates'
access to the audience will only limit the information voters get
about candidates and issues.'
And we certainly cannot ignore the potential of electronic
media as the primary source of information about political issues.
Our country is far too big for candidates to reach most voters by
personal contact.47 In any event, most Americans get their news
from television. A 1992 survey in the Los Angeles Times reported
that 41% of Americans receive all campaign information from
television alone, 38% from television and newspapers, and 80%
mostly from television.' We must use television to improve campaigns, instead of turning away from the defects of today's process. To reform the campaign process, we need to embrace the
communications revolution, not shun it. We need to find ways to
make it easier for candidates to get their messages across and to
challenge other candidates' messages, as opposed to hampering
their ability to do so. The heart of a democratic society is an

Apr. 17, 1995, at 48 (quoting Rupert Murdoch).
44. ld.
45. Rupert Murdoch, Chairman of the News Corp., Remarks at the National Press
Club (Feb. 26, 1996) (transcript on file with author).
46. Ornstein, supra note 39, at 13-14.
47. Id. at 13.
48. Jeffrey A. Levinson, Note, An Informed Electorate: Requiring Broadcasters to
Provide Free Airtime to Candidates for Public Office, 72 B.U. L. REV. 143, 146 n.10
(1992) (citing Survey: Public Prefers Tyson to Politics, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1992, at 13).
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electorate that is provided with sufficient information to make
informed choices.
Indeed, enhancing the ability of candidates to communicate
their messages over television and radio is the policy that underlies the handful of obligations the Communications Act of 1934
already places on broadcasters with respect to campaign advertising. Three major statutory provisions govern broadcasters' current
obligations to political candidates. First, Section 312(a)(7)49 obligates broadcasters as a condition of their licenses to "allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase" of broadcast time by
legally qualified candidates for federal office on behalf of their
candidacies. 50 Second, when a broadcaster permits any political
candidate (federal, state, or local) to use its broadcasting station,
the broadcaster must provide "equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office."'" Third, when a broadcaster sells
time to candidates during specified periods preceding primary and
general elections, the rate must be set at the "lowest unit charge
of the station
for the same class and amount of time for the same
52
period.
In practice this system suffers from two major problems: It
takes a lot of work to apply, and it does not work well. The system requires intense effort to apply because of the difficulty of
identifying a broadcaster's "lowest unit charge." Broadcasters essentially auction off airtime, and each broadcaster seems to employ a unique system for doing so. The result is doubly bad: The
FCC has to get intimately involved in the commercial activities of
broadcasters in order to enforce the Lowest Unit Charge Rule and
media access remains extremely expensive for candidates.53
Some broadcasters have found the Lowest Unit Charge Rule
so difficult a way to meet their public interest obligations that
they have tried to give free time to political candidates.
49. 47
50.

§ 312(a)(7) (1988).

Id

51. Id.
52. Id
53. The Lowest Unit Charge Rule is intended to make available to the candidate

who buys only one or a few spots the same rate paid by the broadcaster's best commercial customer, who buys in bulk. In actuality, however, candidates often pay higher rates
than commercial advertisers. Unlike advertisers who can and do opt for spots that can be
preempted, candidates subject to the now or never pressures of a campaign often purchase the higher priced "nonpreemptible" spots. Codification of the Commission's Political

Programming Policies (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 6 F.C.C.R. 5707, 5709 (1991).
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But-believe it or not-the current system actually discourages
broadcasters from providing candidates with free time. Part of the
problem is that broadcasters that permit a candidate to use their
facilities are obligated by statute to provide equal opportunities for
such use to all other candidates for the same office. 4 The scope
of this obligation and the expense of complying with it becomes
substantial in races with numerous third-party candidates, such as
presidential elections. The problem is exacerbated by the federal
election laws.
In 1992, EZ Communications, the owner of eight radio stations, offered free and equal time to federal candidates in each
state in which it had stations. It asked the Federal Election Commission to approve the offer. Because of uncertainty in the law,
the FEC still has not issued a ruling three years later,55 and EZ
Radio found out it was not at all easy to help further political
debate. The same story is being repeated on the Internet.
CompuServe recently offered free on-line services to candidates,
but the FEC issued an advisory opinion stating that the offer
would be considered a prohibited in-kind contribution.56 The
FEC may well be right in its reading of the election law. But as
Dickens wrote
in Oliver Twist, there are times when "the law is a
57
ass-a idiot.
In light of these circumstances, it seems to me that Congress
should consider clarifying current laws to permit communications
companies to give candidates free access to the public. As long as
the companies are required to do so in an even-handed manner,
there would appear to be little possibility of corruption. Whether
or not Congress takes this step, campaigns inevitably will spread
to all the lanes of the information highway: cable, broadcast, telephone, wireless, and satellite. Even with this proliferation of media
outlets for political campaigning, however, broadcasters will undoubtedly remain the major source of campaign information for
some time. Thus, I believe any short-term solution to the prob-

54. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
55. FEC Advisory Opinion Request 1992-26 concluded without an opinion when the
Commission failed to approve Agenda Document #92-107 by a vote of 3 to 2 (Aug. 13,
1992).
56. Letter from the Federal Election Commission to Stephen M. Heaton, General
Counsel, Compuserve, Inc. (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with author).
57. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 354 (Kathleen Tillotson ed., Oxford University
Press 1966) (1838).
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lems I have described must be based on obligating broadcasters to
provide free time or finding alternative ways of reducing the cost
of airtime to political candidates.
Of course, even if access to electronic media were cheaper
and easier, many candidates would still raise money for other
legitimate campaign purposes. But if candidates could be guaranteed access to a reasonable amount of airtime, they could certainly
cut back on their fundraising efforts and devote more time to the
work for which the public hired them. I doubt there is an elected
official who would not prefer such an outcome.
The concept of requiring broadcasters to donate free time for
political purposes is not new. In 1968, Senator Al Gore, Sr., stated: "The public owns the airwaves which we give the television
and radio stations permission to use, and ...

we could reserve a

certain percentage of time for civic purposes. 58 In 1988, his
son-now our Vice President-introduced a bill to require broadcasters to provide a total of 6 hours of free airtime in the weeks
before a presidential election.59 The Center for Responsive Politics, Common Cause, Henry Geller, Delmer Dunn, John Ellis,
Paul Taylor, Newton Minow and others have all made wise proposals and recommendations regarding free airtime for political
campaigns.0
One technique for providing free time would be to establish a
time bank-broadcasters and all other media providers would donate airtime to the bank and candidates could draw airtime from
the bank during their campaigns. Donations of time with a market
value of, say, $500 million a year would greatly lighten the burden
on candidates to raise money. As I have stated, $500 million is the
total amount all candidates are expected to spend on media advertising in 1996. Yet $500 million is a tiny fraction of the amount

58.

DELMER DUNN, FINANCING PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 119 (1972) (quoting Polit-

ical Campaign Financing Proposals: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm., 90th

Cong., 1st Sess. 130 (1967) (statement of Sen. Gore, Sr.)).
59. S. 2923, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
60. See Petition of Common Cause et al. for Inquiry or Rulemaking to Require Free
Time for Political Broadcasts, (Oct. 21, 1993) (undocketed and on file with FCC); CENTER

FOR RESPONSIVE

POLITICS,

BEYOND THE

30-SECOND

SPOT.

ENHANCING

THE

MEDIA'S ROLE IN CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGNS 42-65 (1988); DUNN, supra note 58, at
82; JOHN ELLIS, NINE SUNDAYS 18 (1991); NEWTON N. MINOW ET AL., PRESIDENTIAL
TELEVISION 159-66 (1973); PAUL TAYLOR, SEE How THEY RUN: ELECING THE PRESIDENT IN AN AGE OF MEDIAOCRACY 270-81 (1990).
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broadcasters earn from advertising. Indeed, it is less than 2% of
the annual advertising revenues of television broadcasters alone.6 '
How would we divide the time contributed to a time bank?
One approach would be to grant each eligible candidate a right to
a specific dollar amount of free time. Candidates would then negotiate with broadcasters for advertising time, just as they currently
do, but would pay with time bank credits rather than actual dollars. Why would broadcasters accept credits? Because they would
be required to provide free time worth, say, 2% of their annual
advertising revenues as a condition of using the public airwaves
for free. Indeed, it would be important for broadcasters to provide
time to candidates lest they lose their licenses.62
And again technology gives us new solutions. Digital broadcasting has just been invented. Within one or two years, digitally
broadcast programs will be offered on currently unused spectrum.
Digital broadcasters will have thousands of hours to fll with entertainment, news, educational television and-if we take the right
steps-enhanced access to candidates, issues, and public debate.
Suppose the assignees of the new spectrum used for digital broadcast were asked to deposit time into a time bank for campaign
advertising? The service is new. No patterns or practices are set.
This is the right time and digital broadcast could be the right
place to stake out a claim for free and fair political debate.
William Safire recently suggested another way to create a
time bank. He suggests that, in conjunction with auctioning broadcast licenses, we might offer bidding credits to broadcasters willing
to provide free time.' Under that approach, broadcasters could
decide to reduce the cash price of their licenses by agreeing to
provide "in kind" public service. There are numerous merits to
such an approach, including the fact that it would seem to diminish the likelihood of litigation-how could a broadcaster voluntarily elect a bidding credit in return for providing free campaign
advertising and then claim that it cannot be forced to comply with
its promise? On the other hand, the amount of the deposit in the

61.

Marketing & Media Ad Notes

. ..

,

WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1995, available in

Westlaw, 1995 WL-WSJ 2113639 at *1.
62. This is a requirement that ought to apply to radio and to any other spectrum
users as well as television broadcasters.
63. William Satire, Good Guys Win 2, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1996, at A17.

1996]

TELEVISION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

1107

time bank would depend on bidders' decisions, and it might not
be enough.
Many of the implementation questions raised by a time bank
would disappear if instead we relied on a trust fund method to
reduce the cost of airtime to political candidates. Moreover, providing candidates access to monies in a trust fund might provide
additional flexibility in the distribution of airtime and in allowing
candidates to use whatever means of communication they deem
best. With a trust fund candidates could and should be afforded
the freedom to select the means of access to their voters, be it
Internet, telephony, cable, satellite, broadcast television, or radio.
Even in these times of federal budget cutting, establishing a
trust fund for these purposes is not out of the question. At the
FCC we have already raised more than $9 billion in spectrum
auctions. Wouldn't it be nice if we could place even a modest part
of that money in a trust fund, and use the interest to provide
matching funds to candidates? The annual interest on $9 billion, if
we had put it in a trust fund, would easily be enough to fund the
current rate of federal congressional media spending. Moreover, as
Senator Dole has been emphasizing recently,' the broadcasters
have been asking for more free spectrum that may be worth as
much as $70 billion. Even if Congress sends all auction revenues
to the Treasury for deficit reduction, trust fund revenues can be
raised in other ways. Income tax returns have a box for contributing matching funds for Presidential races. It certainly seems feasible to use the same method to build a trust fund for political
advertising by providing boxes that taxpayers can check to contribute to a fund that could help reform the political process.
Some think that if a candidate got time from a time bank or
bought it with public trust monies, then the candidate's use of the
airtime should be regulated-thirty-second attack ads, for example,
could be banned.' I disagree. Candidates, like it or not, compete
for attention against the most creative people in the world: those
who invent broadcast television shows and ads. We must give.
candidates and their advisers the room to use their own ingenuity
to attract an audience and to get their message across. But the

64. See Katia Hetter, Bob Dole Breathes Fire on Broadcasters,U.S. NEWS & WORLD

REP., Feb. 5, 1996, at 51.
65. Paul Taylor has proposed five-minute segments in which the format would be
limited to pictures of the candidate. TAYLOR, supra note 60, at 268-69 (1990).
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FCC would not violate this principle by giving candidates a clear
right to buy time in longer blocks than the much maligned 30second ads. We could write rules to give broadcasters a real incentive to grant candidates' requests to buy, for example, five-minute
blocks.
Some claim that proposals such as time banks and trust funds
infringe on free speech. In my view, time banks and trust funds
are clearly constitutional. There would be no viewpoint discrimination and no attempt to suppress speech on any particular topic. To
the contrary, the goal-reforming our political system to better
inform and motivate the electorate, and to reduce the pressure on
candidates to spend the majority of their time raising money-is
of the highest order and requires constitutional support, not rejection. As Professor Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago Law
School has shown, the original and enduring purpose of the First
Amendment is to ensure an educated citizenry able to participate
in our great continuing experiment of democratic self-gover66
nance.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in the CBS case upheld Section
312(a)(7), which it described as "creat[ing] a limited right to
'reasonable' access that pertains only to legally qualified federal
candidates."'67 The Court held that "[t]here is nothing in the First
Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a
licensee to share his frequency with others"' because-and the
Court emphasized this portion of its decision-"[i]t is the right of
the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
69
is paramount.,

For that reason, the Court explained, the free speech interests
at issue in that case were on the government's side, not on the
broadcasters'. The Court said that section 312(a)(7) "makes a
significant contribution to freedom of expression by enhancing the
ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process."70 The Court's decision was squarely in line with the views

of James Madison, who drafted the First Amendment: "The right
66.
67.
68.
(1969)).
69.
70.

SUNSTMIN, supra note 33, at 18-20.
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981).
1& at 395 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389
Id. (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (citations omitted)).
Id.at 396.
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of electing the members of the Government constitutes.., the
essence of a free and responsible government. The value and
efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the comparative
merits and demerits of the candidates for public trust."'"
A time bank would differ from the proposal at issue in CBS
in that broadcasters would provide a substantial portion of time to
candidates for free rather than at the "lowest unit charge." But
that difference does not implicate the First Amendment. Nor does
a time bank proposal, which in effect might amount to a 2% tax
on the advertising receipts of companies granted the free use of
the public spectrum, raise any substantial question under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That is because the financial
impact of a time bank would be insubstantial and would be justified as payment in kind for use of the spectrum. Moreover, under
the Communications Act it is crystal clear that broadcast licensees
have no property claim to the airwaves or to a particular frequency. Takings claims are fatally undermined by this fact.7'
Nonetheless, there are remaining questions of equity, implicated by the idea that time would be taken away from the one channel a broadcast licensee operates in a given town. But providing
incentives for broadcasters to contribute that time would certainly
address any equitable claims. Congress could give broadcasters and
other donors tax deductions for their contributions to the political
process. At the FCC we could consider giving ownership limit
waivers to stations that donate time to be used by candidates for
debates or other public-issue programming. Wouldn't that further
the underlying purpose of our ownership rules: to promote the
presentation of diverse programming? To put it another way, what
could more clearly be in the public interest?

71. See Sunstein, supra note 29, at 38.
72. Congress has explicitly notified broadcasters of their lack of any ownership interest in the spectrum they are permitted to use. Section 304 of the Communications Act
requires a broadcaster seeking a license expressly to state that he or she has no property
interest or claim to the frequency:
No station license shall be granted by the Commission until the applicant there-

for shall have waived any claim to the use of any particular frequency or of
the electromagnetic spectrum as against the regulatory power of the United
States because of the previous use of the same, whether by license or other-

wise.
47 U.S.C. § 304 (Supp. V 1993).
73. For further analysis, see Levinson, supra note 48, at 172-76 (arguing that the
Takings Clause does not bar legislation requiring free airtime for political candidates).
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The need for a clear, specific, and concrete public interest
obligation could not be more evident than in the Commission's
implementation of the Children's Television Act of 1990 (CTA).
Yet the proposed requirement that broadcasters air at least three
(or some other specific number of) hours of educational programming for children each week is at the center of intense debate as
the Commission struggles to determine how the Act should be
implemented.7 4
Congress was aware of the shrinking availability of programming designed for children when it adopted the CTA. When I was
a child, in television's early days, the networks were trying to
persuade families to buy television sets, so they scheduled familystyle programming. In 1951 the networks scheduled 27 hours of
children's television a week: "Kukla, Fran, and Ollie," "Captain
Kangaroo," "Ding-Dong School," and many others. Thereafter, as
former FCC Chairman Newton Minow documents in his recent
book, Abandoned in the Wasteland, educational programming for
children provided by the three historic networks dropped-from
more than eleven hours per week in 1980 to about 4 hours per
week in 1983 and down to fewer than two hours per week in
1990.' s Former Chairman Minow explains that the educational
television of yesterday was not swept away by a force of nature. It
disappeared when the FCC repealed public interest programming
guidelines in the early 1980s.76

74. See Ongoing Children's TV Proceedings, supra note 32, at 6315.
75. MINOW & LAMAY, supra note 11, at 52.
76. In 1984, the Commission eliminated routine review of television licensees' programming and levels of commercialization in the uncontested renewal context. It also
eliminated the non-entertainment programming processing guidelines used in connection
with television renewal applications. Television Deregulation Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984). In denying reconsideration of its decision, the Commission clarified
that its elimination of commercialization restrictions extended beyond general programming to advertising on children's programming as well. Television Deregulation Recon.
Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 357 (1986), affd sub nom. Action for Children's Television, 821 F.2d
741 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (remanding to the FCC for further explanation of its decision to
eliminate children's television commercialization limits).
In 1989 the Commission amended the application form for permits to construct new
commercial AM, FM, or television stations by requiring the applicant to state only that it
is cognizant of and intends to comply with Commission programming policies, rather than
to describe its plans for addressing public issues of concern to the community, including
the unique needs of children. Revision of Application for Construction Permit for Commercial Broadcast Station, 4 F.C.C.R. 3853 (1989), affd sub nom. Action for Children's
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Congress passed the CTA, in part, to reverse the FCC's retreat from children's programming during the 1980s.' A major
provision of the law orders the Commission to consider, when
deciding whether to renew the licenses of broadcasters, "the extent
to which the licensee ..

has served the educational and infor-

mational needs of children through the licensee's overall programming, including programming specifically designed to serve such

needs."78 Thus Congress explicitly directed the Commission to
consider the amount of children's educational programming provided by a broadcaster when determining whether renewal of its
license is consistent with the public interest.79
Yet ever since the CTA became law there has been a heated

dispute at the Commission about setting minimum requirements
for compliance with the Act. Minimums are fiercely supported by
citizens' groups and just as fiercely opposed by broadcasters.8"
Television v. FCC, 906 F.2d 752 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
77. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation report on the
CTA states: "It was because of the FCC's reluctance to act to enhance children's television that the Congress believed a legislative remedy was necessary." S. REP. No. 227,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1989).
78. 47 U.S.C. § 303b(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993). Another provision of the CTA limits the
amount of time that may be devoted to commercial advertising in children's programming
to "not more than 10.5 minutes per hour on weekends and not more than 12 minutes
per hour on weekdays." Id. at § 303a(b). Finally, the C'A established the National Endowment for Children's Educational Television. 47 U.S.C. § 394 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
79. In addition to the broadcaster's programming, the Commission may also consider.
(1) any special nonbroadcast efforts by the licensee which enhance the educational and informational value of such programming to children; and
(2) any special efforts by the licensee to produce or support programming
broadcast by another station in the licensee's marketplace which is specifically
designed to serve the educational and informational needs of children.
47 U.S.C. § 303b(b)(1) & (2) (Supp. V 1993).
80. This is demonstrated most recently in comments filed with the Commission in
MM Docket No. 93-48 in response to Ongoing Children's TV Proceedings, supra note
32. Comments in MM Docket No. 93-48 advocating minimums include: Reply Comments
of the American Psychological Association (FCC Nov. 15, 1995) at 5; Comments of the
Center for Media Education et al. (FCC Oct. 16, 1995) at ii-iii, 24, 32-39 (joined by
Peggy Charren, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the National
Parent Teacher Association, and more than twenty organizations whose purpose is to
promote the education, health, and welfare of children); Comments of the American
Academy of Pediatrics (FCC Oct. 12, 1995) at 3.
Comments in MM Docket No. 93-48 filed in opposition to minimums include:
Reply Comments of Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (FCC Nov. 15, 1995) at 1-2; Ex Parte Presentation on behalf of Fox Broadcasting Co. (FCC Oct. 26, 1995) at 7-9; Comments of
NAB (FCC Oct. 16, 1995) at 10-14, 26-35; Comments of CBS (FCC Oct. 16, 1995) at iiiii, 12-33; Comments of NBC (FCC Oct. 16, 1995) at 2, 23-24; Comments of Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (FCC Oct. 16, 1995) at ii-iii, 7-12.
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Currently, our rules require no minimum amount of educational
programming."' This situation prevails despite the fact that minimums are essential to the Commission's equitable and efficient enforcement of the CTA through the license renewal process. The
Commission certainly would have grounds to deny renewal to a
station that provided zero hours of children's educational programming and took no special steps otherwise to promote educational
programs. But is renewal justified for television stations that air
some, but very little, educational programming for kids?
Faced with this dilemma during the 1992-94 renewal cycle;
Commission staff responded by adopting an internal and unpublicized minimum standard as a guideline for license renewals under
the Act. Internally the staff treated one half-hour a week as an
adequate amount of children's educational programming to justify
renewal.' In view of the Commission's decision in the Children's
Report and Order that broadcasters must air "some [standard
length] educational and informational programming 'specifically
designed' for children,"' the staff had few options. How could
the staff recommend nonrenewal of the license of a broadcaster
that provided "some" standard length programming (however
minimal) of this type? The Commission did not publish this staff
standard. If it had, the public and Congress undoubtedly would
have been shocked and unhappy-one half-hour a week is a star-

81. The Commission's implementing rules incorporate the language of the statute and
define educational and informational programming as "programming which furthers the

positive development of children 16 years of age and under in any respect, including the
child's inteilectuallcognitive or social/emotional needs." 47 C.F.R. § 73.671 note (1995).
Broadcasters are required to air an unspecified amount of standard-length programming

of this type that is specifically designed for children 16 years of age and under. Policies
and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming (Report and Order), 6 F.C.C.R.

2111, 2115 (1991) [hereinafter Children's Report and Order]; Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming (Memorandum Opinion and Order), 6 F.C.C.R.

5093, 5100 (1991). As the Commission recently explained:
We have adopted no other guidelines regarding the types of programming that
may contribute to satisfying a station's renewal review requirement, and our
rules contain no requirement as to the number of hours of educational and
informational programming that stations must broadcast or the time of day
during which such programming may be aired.
Ongoing Children's TV Proceedings, supra note 32, at 6315.
82. This figure was used as an internal processing guideline. Renewal applications
meeting this criterion and otherwise complying with the Communications Act were grant-

ed without further action by the full Commission. Other applications were referred to the
full Commission for decision.
83. Children's Report and Order, supra note 81, at 2115.
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tlingly low requirement. Moreover, this requirement does not
advance the CTA's stated purpose of increasing the amount of
informational and educational programming specifically designed
for children. 4 Its effect seems to be just the reverse.
But, as a practical matter, any license renewal process inevitably leads to quantification. This quantification takes place either in
a public statement of policy, or in a behind-closed-doors practice,
or in a case-by-case process of adjudication. The licensing body
must have criteria that can be uniformly and objectively applied.
The cost of a vague or clandestine implementation of the
public interest standard can be frighteningly high. Imagine a
broadcast licensee whose renewal is denied because it has not
aired enough educational children's programming. Without an
explicit, public standard, the licensee is left to wonder whether the
Commission denied the renewal for some other reason, such as in
retaliation for an anti-government slant in the station's news
broadcasts.
Too fantastic a possibility? For this Commission, yes. But
recent history shows that the potential for such mischief is not a
mere hypothetical. In 1974 President Nixon and his top aides
discussed using the FCC's vague and ambiguous license renewal
process to punish the Washington Post for its Watergate coverage.
On being informed that the Post owned two television stations in
Florida that would soon be seeking renewal, President Nixon is
reported to have said, "The main thing is the Post is going to
have damnable, damnable problems out of this one .... They
have a television station ... and they're going to have to get it
renewed."' Bob Haldeman and John Dean informed Nixon that
the Post also owned a radio station and that the practice by
nonlicensees of filing competing applications at renewal time had
increased. Nixon reportedly responded by stating that "it's going
to be goddamn' ' 6active here .... Well, the game has to be played
awfully rough. 2

84. The Senate Report on the C"'A states that the "objective of this legislation is to
increase the amount of educational and informational broadcast television programming
available to children." S. REP. No. 227, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989).
85. Watergate Tape Points to White House Complicity in Challenges to Post-Newsweek,
BROADCASTING, May 20, 1974, at 25.
86. Id.
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Three months after this conversation, three applications were
filed against the renewal application of the Post's Jacksonville station, and one was filed against the renewal application of its Miami station. Participants in one of the Jacksonville applications
and in the Miami application included a number of individuals

identified as friends and supporters of the President and his Administration.' Whether these applications were part of an effort
to carry out President Nixon's threats is unclear. Even so, they
demonstrate the potential for abuse inherent in vague, ominous,
and empty standards that can be manipulated in a pernicious
manner by an Ri-motivated Commission. As the Supreme Court
stated in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,' "the

absence of express standards makes it difficult to distinguish...
between a licensor's legitimate denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial power. Standards provide the guideposts
that check the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to
determine
whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored
89
speech.

If the Constitution favors the establishment of standards that

provide guideposts, what should those standards be? One of the
options proposed in our ongoing children's television proceedings-an option I support-is to set a minimum number of hours
per week of children's educational programming. But other
quantifiable standards could be clear, concrete, and supportable as
well. We could say that any station delivering less than the aver-

87. Id.
88. 486 U.S. 750, 758 (1988) (holding that an ordinance which required annual permits for coin-operated newsracks violated the First Amendment by granting mayor unbounded discretion to grant, condition, or deny a permit).
89. Id. In National Black Media Coalition v. FCC, 589 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
the D.C. Circuit rejected the argument that the First Amendment compelled the Commission to adopt percentage standards governing the amount of local programming, news,
and public affairs programming a licensee must provide. Id. at 581. (The Commission had
proposed, but decided not to require, licensees to provide 10-15% local programming,
8-10% news, and 3-5% public affairs programming. Id. at 579-80.) I do not quarrel with
that holding. Moreover, the Commission's approach in that case did not have the benefit
of providing certainty because, even if the Commission had adopted the percentage standards, it intended to conduct "an ad hoc hearing . . . to weigh the effect of other factors
in each individual case." Id. at 581. Thus, the adoption of quantitative standards in that
case would not have eliminated problems arising from ad hoc weighing of factors. But
even though the First Amendment does not necessarily require the adoption of quantitative standards, it is more First Amendment-friendly to do so, especially if the quantitative
standards make it possible to avoid ad hoc balancing.
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age number of hours of educational television, using the current,
broad definition would not get renewed. Or should it be only the
bottom third in performance? Or the bottom tenth? Or just the
worst television station in the country in terms of children's educational television?
Whatever the standard, letting broadcasters know what it is
ahead of time is the proper thing to do.' Indeed, if the FCC's
approach to the public interest standard is to be at once aggressively deregulatory, market-oriented, and consistent with the First
Amendment, the Commission must state clearly what it expects
from broadcasters.
I am absolutely convinced that broadcasters would willingly
comply with any reasonable quantification of their public interest
standards and they would compete aggressively to attract audiences to their educational television shows. In addition, requiring a
certain amount of educational programming is not only fairer to
all broadcasters than a failure to state any minimum, it is also in
their financial interest. Without a clear minimum standard, broadcasters who do more to fulfill their obligations will suffer financially, because sports and other entertainment programming attract
larger audiences than educational television. In the absence of
clear standards, competitive pressures could drive some broadcasters to react to the absence of a mandatory minimum by reducing
their educational children's programming to zero for several
months in a row. A quantifiable minimum standard could eliminate, or at least lessen, the potential that such a problem will arise.
Some say that quantitative children's television standards
would violate the First Amendment. A frequently cited case in

90. The Supreme Court has made it clear that regulating speech by an "unascer-

tainable standard" chills protected expression and is neither wise nor constitutionally
tolerable. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611, 614 (1971) (holding that an ordinance

that prohibited the assembly of three or more persons on the sidewalks, except at a public meeting, who "conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by" was

unconstitutionally vague and violated the constitutionally protected right of free assembly
and association). "The danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First
Amendment rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform . . .

what is being proscribed." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (finding that statutes were unconstitutionally vague and violated the First Amendment where

they required removal from state employment for "the utterance of any treasonable or
seditious ...

words or the doing of any treasonable or seditious acts," and removal and

disqualification of persons who distribute material advocating forcible overthrow of the
government or who advocate, embrace, or transmit that view themselves).
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support is the Supreme Court "must-carry" decision in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.9 ' It is an odd citation. That
case did not vindicate a First Amendment claim. Instead it upheld
the principle that Congress and the FCC may require cable operators to carry broadcast stations-over the cable operators' First
Amendment objections-as long as the evidence shows that broadcast stations would really be harmed in the absence of a mustcarry requirement.
In Turner Broadcasting, the Court stated that "broadcast
programming ...

is subject to certain limited content restraints

imposed by statute and FCC regulation."' Moreover, the Court
noted that the CTA directs the FCC to consider whether a license
renewal applicant has served the educational needs of children. 3
Thus, the Court explicitly recognized that a broadcaster may lose
its license if it does not air enough children's educational programming, and the Court appeared to approve of that requirement.
The Court did note that broadcasters were not currently required
to carry any particular quantity of educational broadcasting,94 but
it did not say that such a requirement would be impermissible. To
the contrary, the Court recognized that broadcasters are subject to
"certain limited content restraints,"'95 including those imposed by
96
the CTA, as well as obligations relating to political campaigns.
In my view, a rule requiring three hours a week of educational programming for children-which amounts to 1.8 percent of the
broadcast week-is precisely what the Court had in mind by a
"limited" restraint. Any content restrictions imposed by such a
rule exist only at the highest level of generality. Under the FCC's
proposed rule, broadcasters would not be told what to say or even
what topics to address, but simply would have to provide some
programming on any subject fairly termed "educational."'
This reading of Turner Broadcastingis compelled by the CBS
decision which, unlike Turner Broadcasting, directly concerned
broadcasters' obligations. As explained in more detail above,98 in

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
Id. at 2462.
Id. at 2462 n.7.
Id. at 2463.
lId. at 2462.
Id. at 2462 n.7.
Ongoing Children's TV Proceedings, supra note 32, at 6327-28.
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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CBS the Court held that broadcasters may be forced to carry
campaign advertising. The Court explained that "[a] licensed
broadcaster is 'granted the free and exclusive use of a limited and
valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts that franchise
it is burdened by enforceable public obligations."' 99 One of those
obligations is to serve the educational needs of children. Through
the CTA, Congress has made clear that broadcast licenses should
not be renewed in the absence of evidence that the licensee has
provided educational programming. The CBS decision squarely
supports any rules establishing quantified minimum guidelines for
compliance with the CTA.
A reading of the First Amendment that permits educational
programming requirements is fully consistent with the
Amendment's purposes. As Justice Louis Brandeis said in Whitney
v. California,'° "the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people."'10 ' The author of the First Amendment, James Madison, believed that its freedoms were designed to produce a dynamic democracy that would require and should encourage a certain kind
of citizen-one who takes his or her citizenship seriously." 2 Alexander Meiklejohn, perhaps the most influential twentieth-century
philosopher of the First Amendment, similarly asserted that the
First Amendment should promote a public capable of engaging in
public debate on public issues, not one that engages in whatever
sort of speech is most remunerative. 0 3 His spiritual progeny include the brilliant Cass Sunstein at Chicago Law School, who
makes similarly astute arguments from history and the Constitution. It is constitutional to mandate that a reasonable amount of
time on the public airwaves be used to provide education for our
children. Such requirements would be in the tradition of Brandeis
and Meiklejohn, and would help produce the kind of citizens of
whom Madison would be proud.

99. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1966) (quoting Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (1966)).
100. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

101. Id at 375.
102. SuNSTEIN, supra note 33, at xvi-xvii.
103. LId. at 38, 122, and accompanying notes.
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REGULATING TELEVISION INDECENCY AND VIOLENCE

With respect to indecency and violence on television, I have
two related messages, one primarily for academics and one primarily for the television industry. To academics: Please understand
that there are some programs society is rightfully not going to
allow to be broadcast into people's homes unless parents can
ensure that their children will not be able to watch them. If your
constitutional theory cannot accommodate regulation of that sort,
there is something wrong with your constitutional theory, as the
Supreme Court's decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
shows.'" To the industry: If you want to show indecent or violent television shows, you are going to have to take steps to allow
parents to have some real control over what their children see.
You have taken a very important first step by pledging to develop
a television rating system to be used with the V-chip. I hope it
will be followed by other steps to promote use of the V-chip and
similar mechanisms to enhance parental control.
The Supreme Court established the fundamental framework
for analyzing indecency and violence on television in its 1978
decision in Pacifica. Pacifica involved George Carlin's "seven dirty
words" monologue. A father was driving in his car with his child
at two o'clock in the afternoon when they heard part of the
monologue. It's a funny routine, but it's not suitable for children.
As my colleague Commissioner James Quello has stated on numerous occasions with respect to a certain word used frequently in
Carlin's monologue, "I've heard it, I've said it, I've done it. But
not around kids." The Court recognized that the monologue was
not obscene"5 and that adults could not be prevented from listening to it." It also recognized that the routine had been preceded by a statement that the monologue was not suitable for
children." But the Court held that the broadcaster could be penalized-perhaps even lose its license-if it played such material
when children were likely to be in the audience.'
The Court did not elaborate on its standard of review, but it
did not apply strict scrutiny. It instead held that broadcasting is

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Id. at 735.
Id. at 750 n.28.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 748-51.
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unique for two reasons: Radio and television have a "uniquely
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans,"'"19 and they are
"uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to
read." ' As Justice Stevens explained in his opinion for the
Court, and as Justice Powell emphasized in his concurring opinion,
those factors distinguish broadcasts from the media and justify
special steps to control indecent material carried on television and
radio."'
In the Pacifica opinion, the Supreme Court recognized that
adults have sources other than the broadcast media for obtaining
access to indecent materials, so that restrictions on broadcasting
indecent material are not particularly burdensome."' Technological developments have strengthened the force of that argument. In
1978, when Pacifica was decided, there were no video stores and
almost no premium cable channels. Today both are plentiful. Thus,
technological developments make it easier to justify restrictions on
indecent broadcasting today.
It also is useful to recall that indecent publications are treated
somewhat differently than others. The Supreme Court held in
Ginsberg v. New York"' that the owner of a newsstand could be
punished for selling an indecent magazine to an adolescent, even
though the magazine was not obscene. The magazine in question
was Sir, a competitor to Playboy. So although broadcasters often
complain that they are treated as second-class citizens, that complaint is overstated. All sorts of "speakers"-including the traditional print media-face limitations designed to prevent children
from obtaining access to indecent material without their parents'
permission.
In any event, as the Supreme Court recognized in Pacifica,
the analogy between broadcasters and magazine publishers is
somewhat strained. Former FCC Commissioner Mark Fowler compared television to a "toaster with pictures,"114 but I think television is more like a constantly changing billboard in your family
room. I am confident that it would be constitutional to prohibit

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

lId at 748.
Id.at 749.
Id. at 748-49, 758-59.
Id. at 750 n.28.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
MINow & LAMAY, supra note 11, at 26.
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billboards from showing pictures that are indecent but not obscene. That is, society would not tolerate billboards of centerfolds
on Main Street, even though it would be impermissible to prohibit
the sale of Playboy to adults. In the case of such a billboard, the
Court would hold that "a pig has entered the parlor," just as it
did in Pacifica."5
In my view, broadcasters should be permitted to show indecent material on television if they do so late at night or if they
provide electronic ratings so that parents can block out shows they
don't want their children to see. The first restriction-allowing
indecent broadcasts, but only late at night-was upheld last summer by the en banc D.C. Circuit in Action for Children's Television v. FCC (ACT III). The Supreme Court recently denied the
plaintiff broadcasters' petition for a writ of certiorari.116 In that
case, the court of appeals upheld a ban that extends from 6 a.m
to 10 p.m., and made clear that a ban from 6 a.m. to midnight
would be constitutional. 117 Moreover, even though the Supreme
Court has never applied strict scrutiny in a broadcast case, the
court of appeals held that a 6 a.m. to midnight ban would be
constitutional even if tested under strict scrutiny. The government's compelling interest, the court held, is the protection of
children from materials that would impair their ethical and moral
development. The court found that there is currently no effective
means of advancing that interest other than a fairly extensive
restriction on the hours during which indecent programming may
be aired.
If broadcasters want to show indecent material at other times
of the day, they are going to have to embrace technology. They
could argue, for example, that they should be allowed to broadcast
indecent material outside of the current safe harbor hours if the
programming were electronically labeled. If circuitry that could
effectively block such labeled material were widely available, they
could further argue that children would be adequately protected,
even if the show were aired when a substantial number of children
were in the audience.
As it happens, Congress has just enacted legislation requiring
that all television sets larger than thirteen inches contain chips

115.

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.

116. 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
117. Ild. at 664.
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capable of reading such electronic tags. 18 Although these have
been called "V-chips" by proponents who hope they will be used
to allow parents to prevent their children from watching excessively violent shows, any sort of electronic "label" can be read by the
chip. Broadcasters who want to air indecent programming therefore should be developing labeling systems and trying to persuade
Congress and the Commission to allow indecent programming
outside of the current 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. safe harbor if the programming is labeled.
Let me turn to definitional matters for a moment. What is
indecent? The Supreme Court in Pacifica approved the
Commission's long-standing definition," 9 which focuses on
whether a broadcast "describes 'sexual or excretory activities and
organs' in terms that are patently offensive as measured by con'2
temporary community standards for the broadcast medium.'
Although law professors find it hard to get past the problem that
this definition can be difficult to apply to some cases-particularly
to hypothetical situations unlikely to actually occur-in the "real
world" there is little doubt about how to classify most programming. For example, as the D.C. Circuit noted in its recent en banc
decision, one 1987 case involved a radio broadcast "contain[ing]
'explicit references to masturbation, ejaculation, breast size, penis
size, sexual intercourse, nudity, urination, oral-genital contact,
erections, sodomy, bestiality, menstruation and testicles.'," And
as the court also noted, "it is important to understand that hardcore pornography
may be deemed indecent rather than ob122
scene."'

The Commission's indecency decisions show that the primary
factors to be considered when determining whether a broadcast is
indecent include the explicitness of the material; whether it dwells
on sexual or excretory matters; whether the material panders or is
presented for shock value; and whether it appears in a work that

118. § 551(c), 110 Stat. at 141.
119. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-41, 743.
120. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1975); see also Infinity Broadcasting, 2
F.C.C.R. 2705, 2705 (1987).
121. ACT III, 58 F.3d 654, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting In re Infinity Broadcasting
Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 932 (1987)). The court noted that two other 1987 cases "were
similarly objectionable." Id. See Regents of the University of California, 2 F.C.C.R. 2703
(1987); Pacifica Radio, 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2700 (1987).
122. ACT Ii, 58 F.3d at 660.
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has serious merit. Of course, it is not possible to apply those factors mechanically, and broadcasters will in some cases try to come
as close to the line as possible without crossing it. However, I
think that it is useful to focus on cases that have actually arisen
rather than cases that can be hypothesized. And if the focus is on
the real world rather than the hypothesized world, it becomes
clear that the Commission has not been applying the indecency
rules in an unpredictable manner. Indeed, not a single indecency
determination by the Commission has been overturned by the
courts on the ground that the Commission incorrectly determined
that a program was indecent."z
One might think that a liberalizing of societal standards will
render indecency a non-issue. In fact, a liberalizing of standards
may exacerbate the problem. Perhaps the entire nation will one
day have a standard similar to that of New York, as discerned by
the Second Circuit in the case involving "Deep Throat,"124 and
nothing will be considered obscene. Whatever the standard, in my
view adults should be able to watch whatever they choose, provided they have an opportunity to make a reasonably informed
choice to avoid shows that will offend them. Let me make clear
that I am not interested in restricting adult choice and let me
dissociate myself from anyone who is. Nor do I mean to suggest
that there are no real definitional issues. There are. And we
should take every care to be attentive to even the scintilla of a
possibility that in an indecency case the Commission might be
censoring political expression or suppressing in any way something
that James Madison would recognize as a First Amendment interest. But notwithstanding my commitment to freedom of viewing
choice for adults, neither I nor virtually any other adult in this
country believes that it is acceptable for twelve-year-olds to watch
"Deep Throat" on television. And even if you think "Deep
Throat" is acceptable for children, I think you will draw the line
somewhere. In short, there are some things that are clearly inappropriate to broadcast when children are likely to be in the audience. The First Amendment is not a cultural suicide pact for a
123. In addition, the D.C. Circuit recently upheld the validity of the Commission's
procedure for enforcing the indecency rules by imposing forfeitures. Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3484

(Jan. 16, 1996).
124. United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132 (2d Cir.
1983).
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value-oriented society. It does not prohibit any and all government
efforts to help parents control what their children watch.
With respect to indecency, basic cable television is just like
broadcast television. In another en banc decision handed down last
summer, Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit
correctly held that "cable television is sufficiently pervasive and
easily accessible to children to justify the government's attempts to
regulate indecency" on non-premium channels.'" The Supreme
Court has decided to review that decision. If it reaches the issue
(the focus of the case is on a state action question), I think the
Court will agree with the D.C. Circuit that cable television is pervasive, now that about 65 percent of Americans subscribe. In 1991,
Congress called cable "our Nation's dominant video distribution
medium, ' " 6 as the Court recognized in the "must-carry"
case. 27 Premium channels are another matter. If you don't want
your kids to watch indecent shows, don't subscribe to the Playboy
Channel. But many cable systems carry fifty or sixty non-premium
channels, and it is impossible for even the most attentive parent to
know what is on all of those channels even most of the time.
The above arguments-regarding the Commission's mandate,
specific regulatory options, and the proper approach to definitional
issues-apply with even greater force to issues of violence on
television. Dissenting in the Alliance for Community Media case,
Judge Edwards described as "curious ... Congress's failure to
address violence on television," in part because "there is significant evidence suggesting a causal connection between viewing
violence on television and antisocial violent behavior."'" As
Judge Edwards stated, there is an impressive body of evidence
suggesting that television violence presents a real social problem.'29 In light of that evidence, I think the only real question is

125. 56 F.3d 105, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert granted sub nom. Denver Educ. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 471 (1995).

126. S. REP. No. 92, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991).
127. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2454 (1994) (addressing

the constitutionality of statutory requirements that required cable systems to carry local
broadcast stations).
128. Alliance for Community Media, 56 F.3d at 149 (Edwards, J.,dissenting in part).
129. ld.at 149 n.1; UCLA VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 10 (reviewing the
literature and concluding that the "[s]cientific evidence strongly suggests that there is a
link between violence on television and that in the real world. The degree and nature of
that link is not so clear"). Others find that the existing research demonstrates a strong

link. In its report, the American Psychological Association concludes that:
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the extent to which television violence has contributed to the
rising rate of violence in our society over the last half-century.
Some estimates are sobering. Dr. Brandon Centerwall, in a crosscultural study published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association, stated that "if, hypothetically, television technology
had never been developed, there would today be 10,000 fewer
homicides each year in the United States, 70,000 fewer rapes, and
700,000 fewer injurious assaults."' 0 I do not know if those estimates are accurate. But even some in the television industry have
acknowledged that the whole premise of television advertising is
that television affects behavior, and they concede that watching
extensive amounts of televised violence must have a negative
effect on children.'
Senator Ernest Hollings, a long-time leader' on this matter,
advocates channeling violent shows into safe harbor hours. In
1993, and again in 1995, he introduced legislation calling on the
Commission to restrict violent programming to hours when children are unlikely to comprise a substantial portion of the viewing
audience. He explained that his approach "is consistent with
Supreme Court decisions recognizing the compelling nature of the
Government's interest in helping parents supervise their children
and in independently protecting the well-being of its youth." '33
In support of that conclusion, Senator Hollings cited on the Senate
floor the American Psychological Association's estimate "that a
typical child will watch 8,000 murders and 100,000 acts of violence
before finishing elementary school" and reviewed the "overwhelmThe accumulated research clearly demonstrates a correlation between viewing
violence and aggressive behavior. Children and adults who watch a large num-

ber of aggressive programs also tend to hold attitudes and values that favor the
use of violence.
Id. (quoting from AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, BIG WORLD, SMALL
SCREEN: THE ROLE OF TELEVISION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1992)). For another literature review also expressing this positive view of the existing research, see John P.

Murray, The Impact of Televised Violence, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 809, 825 (1994) (finding
"extensive, cumulative evidence of potential harmful effect[s]" of viewing televised violence).

130. Brandon S. Centerwall, Television and Violence: The Scale of the Problem and
Where to Go From Here, 267 JAMA, June 10, 1992, at 3059, 3061.
131. The cable industry funded a study that has just concluded that "'psychologically
harmful' violence is pervasive" on television. See Paul Farhi, Study Finds Real Harm in

TV Violence; Programs Cited for Failure to Show Consequences, WASH. POST, Feb. 6,
1996, at Al.
132. S. 1383, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 470, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
133. 141 CONG. REc. S3059 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1995).
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ing" body of social science evidence "conclusively find[ing] a link
between television violence and real-world violence."'
While Commissioner James Quello was Chairman, he urged
Congress to restrict violent shows to a safe harbor like that proposed by Senator Hollings if the broadcasters will not adopt an
effective solution on their own. 35 I agree that a private solution,
rather than governmental regulation, would be the preferable
response to the problems presented by television violence. That is
particularly so because the problems presented by television violence may be intimately tied to content. Although some researchers, such as Dr. Centerwall, believe that we should be wary of all
types of video violence, many other researchers think that different sorts of shows have different effects. The most harmful, these
researchers think, are realistic shows where violence is portrayed
in a positive manner. Shows where violent behavior is punished
may actually discourage violent behavior, and truly gratuitous
violence may have a negligible effect.'36 Government regulation
of television violence, which would necessarily be somewhat general in nature, might not be as effective as a more nuanced private
approach.
However, channeling violence to safe harbor hours would be
constitutional. The ACT III decision upheld the channeling of
indecency, and the main difference between violence and indecency, as Judge Edwards has stated, is that the harmful effects of
violence are better established, so that the governmental interest is
even clearer. 37 A second difference is that indecency often involves language, whereas violence usually does not. Accordingly,
the depiction of violence is farther from the core of the First
Amendment. Indeed, although I see why burning a draft card is a
form of symbolic speech, 38 it is hard to see, for example, how

134. Id
135. Statement of James H. Quello, Chairman, FCC, before the Senate Commerce
Committee (Oct. 20, 1993).
136. See UCLA VIOLENcE REPORT, supra note 13, at 21-22.
137. ACT 1i, 58 F.3d 654, 671 (en banc) (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, J., dissenting);
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (citing studies demonstrating that prolonged childhood exposure to television
violence correlates with increased levels of physical aggressiveness and violence). See also
H.R. REP. No. 101-123, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6901-6914 (reviewing the evidence on the impact of television violence on children).
138. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (referring to O'Brien's
argument that burning draft card is symbolic speech).
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the visual depiction in "Friday the 13th" of someone wearing a
mask beheading someone else in an extraordinarily gruesome
fashion has much of anything to do with free speech. James Madison would have trouble understanding that the television industry
is relying on his handiwork to defend their right to show such
movies at any time and without any advisories. The differences
between violence and indecency support the proposition that, as a
matter of constitutional law, regulation of violence is less objectionable than regulation of indecency. Because the Supreme Court
made clear in Pacifica that indecent material may be regulated, as
the en banc D.C. Circuit has just confirmed in ACT III, it is
therefore permissible to regulate television violence.
The V-chip legislation has now been signed into law. It is
useful to understand just how narrow the V-chip legislation is. It
requires that V-chips be installed in new television sets larger than
thirteen inches,139 but little beyond that. The FCC is directed to
determine whether, a year after enactment, the industry has established acceptable voluntary rules for rating video programming
that contains violent or sexual material."4 If the Commission determines that the industry has not established acceptable rules,14'
it is directed to appoint an advisory committee to develop a rating
system.' The Commission is not directed to force broadcasters
(or anyone else) to label their programming for violent content.
While broadcasters are developing a rating system to label
their material, and the public awaits the sale of televisions
equipped with the V-chip, Congress should consider channeling
violent shows that do not contain an electronic tag into safe harbor hours when children are unlikely to be watching and permitting violent shows that are labeled to be shown at other times.
This is an approach that would satisfy any judicial standard, even
strict scrutiny. 43 The industry had previously argued that V-chips

139. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 551(c), 110 Stat. at 141.
140. lI at § 551(e)(1)(A).
141. Id
142. Id. at § 551(b).
143. Judge Edwards has argued that V-chip legislation can be written in a way that is
content-neutral and thus not subject to strict scrutiny, particularly if it "neither requires
'transmission' of ratings nor imposes any specific ratings categories." Harry T. Edwards &
Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1487, 1566
(1995). At the same time, he argues that rules requiring labeling of programming according to its violent content are subject to strict scrutiny and that such labeling used in conjunction with a blocking system like the V-chip would serve a compelling state interest in
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raise "prior restraint" and "compelled speech" issues, but there is
no merit to those claims. With respect to the prior restraint argument, there need be no delay resulting from labels. To the extent
that delay is a possibility, unlabeled shows may be shown during
safe harbor hours. To the extent that there is any compelled
speech claim, broadcasters should be free to disown any label
attached to their programs. Allowing the broadcaster to identify
the label as the product of a rating body with which the broadcaster does not (necessarily) agree goes a long way toward eliminating a compelled speech argument. 1" Alternatively, broadcasters could air the show during safe harbor hours without a label.
A labeling requirement-even one calling for mandated government labels-would be less questionable constitutionally than
the requirement upheld in Meese v. Keene.45 That case involved
three Canadian films about nuclear war and acid rain classified as
"political propaganda" under the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938."4 The films therefore had to be provided to the Attorney General and labeled before they were shown. The standard
label states that a film has been registered under the Foreign
Agents Registration Act and ominously adds that "[r]egistration
does not indicate approval of the contents of [the film] by the
United States Government."' 47 The Court rejected the constitutional attack on the Act even though the appellant argued was "a
Classic Example of Content-Based Government Regulation of
Core-Value Protected Speech" and noted the Act's reporting and
disclosure requirements apply only to speech with a "political or
public-policy content."'" With respect to the labeling require-

"facilitating parents' ability to control how much violent programming their children
watch." Id. at 1563. In addition, the V-chip could be shown to be the least restrictive
means of furthering this interest. Both Judge Edwards and Judge Wald have argued that

the use of V-chip circuitry constitutes a less restrictive alternative to time channeling.
ACT III, 58 F.3d 654, 683 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, J., dissenting); id. at 687 n.4
(Wald, J., dissenting).
144. The Court has rejected the argument that requiring cable operators to carry
broadcast stations amounted to compelled speech, in part because, "[gliven cable's long

history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little risk that cable
viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable station convey ideas

or messages endorsed by the cable operator." Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S.
Ct. 2445, 2465 (1994).
145. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
146. 52 Stat. 631-33 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1994)).
147. 481 U.S. at 471.
148. Id. at 478.
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ment, the Court twice explained that labels advance free speech
interests and that suppression of labels injures free speech interests: It described the labels as calling for "additional disclosures
that would better enable the public to evaluate the import of the
propaganda," and concluded that "[i]ronically, it is the injunction
entered 49
by the District Court that withholds information from the
public."1
Thus, a mandatory V-chip labeling requirement would be
permissible under Meese v. Keene.'50 On the one hand, any burden imposed by a V-chip labeling requirement would not be imposed on core political speech. On the other hand, the purpose of
the V-chip is to provide useful information to parents. Thus, it
seems doubtful, or at least ironic, that the First Amendment could
be relied upon to justify suppression of this information.
In February, when I presented an earlier version of this Article at the Duke Law Journal's 27th Annual Administrative Law
Conference, it seemed more likely that broadcasters would raise
these types of constitutional objections, given their initial opposition to the V-chip legislation.' With the broadcasters' subsequent agreement to develop a rating system for the V-chip, however, they have turned to potentially more difficult and, from my
perspective, more fruitful issues. One such issue is how violence
should be defined.
Finding an answer will present some novel questions. But the
monitors established in 1994 by the broadcast and cable industries
to evaluate the violent content of their programming have been
working on this problem for more than a year. I hope their work
will suggest a way to translate and apply the academic literature.
Based on preliminary reports, it appears they are well on their
way to doing so. Their experience shows that it is possible to
differentiate between many different types of violence 2 and

149. Id. at 480, 481.
150. Moreover, as noted above, the recently enacted V-chip legislation does not autho-

rize the government to label videos, but merely directs it to develop a labeling system if
the industry does not do so. Accordingly, it presents no serious constitutional issue at all.
151. The press reported that despite President Clinton's support for the V-chip in the
State of the Union Message and broadcasters' intent to accept his invitation to the White
House to discuss the quality of their programming, broadcasters initially continued to
object to the V-chip. Alan Bash, Networks Unmoved by Clinton's Call for V-chip, USA
TODAY, Jan. 25, 1996, at 8D.

152. See, e.g., UCLA VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 22 (listing sports violence,
cartoon violence, slapstick violence, and "anything that involves physical harm of any
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technology would allow parents to decide which categories to
invite into their homes. I would like nothing better than to adopt
a valid rating system developed by the industry.
I would also like to "outsource" determinations of what is
violent or indecent-I hope that the industry will develop the
basic standards. After that, I envision panels of experts composed
of academics, parents, and industry members helping the Commission to determine close cases where, for example, our indecency rules are allegedly violated. The Commission would probably
have to make an independent judgment, but it would be welladvised to rely on the panel's conclusions.
CONCLUSION

In closing, it is useful to recall the virtues of free broadcast
television. As I have stated, the news, sports, and entertainment
programming provided by broadcasters is of great value. But Congress has provided that users of the airwaves must serve the public
interest in other ways. Broadcasters ought to provide specific
amounts of educational television for children and specific
amounts of free campaign coverage. And television should not
disserve the public interest by making it difficult for parents to
monitor their children's access to indecent and violent shows. In
fact, by pledging to develop the ratings that the V-chip will transmit, broadcasters have taken the first step in assisting parents in
monitoring their children's television viewing. I look forward both
to seeing the broadcasters' rating system and welcoming their
additional work with the Commission on making V-chip technology useful to parents.

sort, intentional or unintentional").

